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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

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CIA/RR IP-255

THE EFFECT ON THE COMMUNISTS
OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

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THE EFFECT ON THE COMMUNISTS
OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION*

I. Major Offensive Using All Available Weapons.

A. The transportation system in Manchuria is meager and overburdened. Destruction of railroad repair shops, transportation facilities, and railroad yards would seriously interfere with the flow of materials and equipment vital to Communist China's war effort. It would also seriously hamper production in the industrial centers in that area.

* The material supplied by CRR is arranged in accordance with the outline of the terms of reference for SE-20, dated 19 November 1951. The sections assigned to CRR are I A; II A, B, C; III A; and Annex A, A.

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II. Shipping Embargo and Naval Blockade.

A. Full Embargo on Exports to Communist China.

China's foreign trade now follows the established Soviet Bloc pattern. With non-Communist nations, China exchanges nonstrategic materials (mostly agricultural products) for more or less strategic items. China's participation in intra-Soviet Bloc trade is characterized chiefly by an interchange of strategic items. Manufactured products flow eastward, and raw materials are sent westward. China's dependence on strategic manufactured products continues to exceed Bloc dependence on Chinese raw materials.

The current embargo on direct exports to Communist China by the US is, on the whole, effective. Controls are not so effective from the Ryukyu Islands and Japan. Embargoes by other Western countries vary in effectiveness, depending upon each country's interpretation of strategic materials. The embargo is effective for most items on International List I. Portugal's failure to institute adequate controls in Macao and Timor now represents the principal gap. Export controls in Hong Kong appear to be working fairly well, although they have been instituted too recently for a reliable estimate to be made. The extensive smuggling which persists throughout the Far Eastern area cannot be controlled by embargo measures alone.

A complete and coordinated embargo by the US and the other major Western powers would probably reduce the Chinese war potential and in some instances would severely injure the Chinese economy. Cutting off pharmaceuticals, trucks and replacement parts, and petroleum would present the Chinese economy with very difficult replacement problems and would put a severe strain on the Soviet economy if it endeavored to fill the gaps. In the case of cotton and rubber, the existing supplies and domestic productive facilities are probably sufficient for basic needs for at least a year or even two, and uncontrolled alternative sources of supply are close at hand.

Free ports and foreign trade zones all over the world continue to be used for speculative storage, reconsignment of materials, and evasion of national export controls in clandestine trade with the Soviet Bloc. China continues to receive critical cargoes by means of this peripheral routing. As long as Ceylon and India and such Western countries as Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands in effect encourage this traffic by their present legislation, embargo measures cannot have full effect.

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B. Control of Shipping.

The Chinese economy depends on four types of shipping: (1) river, (2) coastal, (3) nearseas, and (4) oceanic. Only the latter three can be reached by shipping controls or blockades. At present the total navigable river mileage is about 13,000 miles. A relatively normal total requirement for Chinese river shipping is about 200,000 gross tons. The major part of China's inland waterborne commerce normally moves in larger vessels which ply the deep draft sections of the major rivers and engage in some coastal shipping. Thousands of junks, sampans, and other small power craft render irreplaceable service on thousands of miles of smaller rivers and canals.

The chief ports of call in the coastal service have been those south from Shanghai. Northern and Manchurian ports principally serve their immediate hinterland. A relatively normal total requirement for Chinese coastal shipping is approximately 800,000 gross tons.

Before World War II, about 760,000 gross tons of shipping were engaged in the nearseas commerce. Japanese and British vessels carried more than 75 percent of this trade, the Chinese share never reaching 2 percent. Since the war, Japanese ships have not engaged in this trade, and the virtual elimination of Japanese supply sources has greatly reduced the volume of nearseas trade. The remainder can be effectively cut off by further shipping controls and blockades.

Before World War II the principal oceanic shipping routes extended to the two major world industrial centers, the US and northwestern Europe. British vessels dominated the European route. US ships were most evident on the trade route to Manila and the US. Japanese, German, and Norwegian vessels were important in servicing both of these routes.

Since the Communist seizure of power in China, the discrimination against foreign interests and the countermeasures taken by non-Bloc countries have altered the pattern completely. The mainland is now serviced in very limited volume by Bloc-controlled vessels, chiefly Polish-flag vessels, and by blockade runners. This haphazard and frequently more or less clandestine traffic ignores established trade routes and is governed by the availability of bunkers, the location of strategic cargoes at transshipment points, and peripheral routing to avoid export controls and blockades.

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Such charter, bunker, and transportation controls as now exist for trade with China are, in essence, unilateral measures. To date, COCOM has evolved no unified charter or transportation controls, and bunkering is regulated only by embargoes on commodities involved therein. The work of the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, established by the North Atlantic Treaty Council, has not yet progressed beyond the initial exploratory stage. The shipping controls envisaged in the recent report of the UN Collective Measures Committee are basically unilateral measures, supplementary to direct controls over the export of commodities to an aggressor. Maximum coordination of international shipping controls comparable in effectiveness to current US measures could deprive Communist China of most shipping services except river traffic.

C. Naval Blockade.

During World War II, China demonstrated its capacity to survive without direct large-scale coastal, nearseas, and oceanic shipping. The northern and western border areas today are dominated by a major land power politically and militarily interested in the survival of Chinese Communism. In the border areas to the south and southwest of China, civil strife and anti-Western agitation reflect the large-scale Communist infiltration along the communication routes that represented Chinese life lines in World War II.

At present, China does not have the capability of transporting its maritime trade in Chinese ships. Of the limited cargoes now reaching China, the bulk is transported in non-Communist-flag shipping. The increasing use of Polish vessels in recent months points up the growing importance of Poland's merchant fleet as the chief intra-Bloc shipping agent. Non-Communist governments have abetted this program, unwittingly or under severe economic pressure, by allowing Poland to time-charter ships of their registries. The latter vessels, under existing controls, cannot be used in the trade with Communist China, but considerable Polish and other Bloc tonnage was thus released for use on the restricted Far Eastern routes.

The application of broader shipping controls to the China trade,

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encompassing the merchant fleets and bunker and transshipment facilities of the entire free world, could impose severe stress and difficult choices upon the Soviet Bloc in general and could affect the economic potential of Communist China in particular. Effective Western charter and transportation controls could cause a revision particularly in Polish maritime policy, which might result in withdrawal of Satellite ships from China routes. Some Soviet vessels might be made available to offset this. The use of alternative overland routes into China would be severely restricted by the hazardous nature, seasonal availability, and load limits of existing road and rail communications.

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III. Bombing Attacks throughout China.

A.

1. Aircraft Industry.

China produces neither civilian nor military aircraft. Chinese Air Force planes are sent from the USSR and assembled in certain areas of China and Manchuria, such as Mukden, Harbin, Changchun, and Canton. Since the physical and technical requirements for assembly of aircraft shipped in are not difficult to fulfill, the destruction of such centers would have only a nuisance value.

2. Shipbuilding and Repair Facilities.

The primary impact of air and naval bombardment of Chinese shipbuilding and repair facilities would be on the 11 leading shipyards located in coastal areas. Such destruction would deprive China and the Soviet Bloc of important facilities for the repair and maintenance of both merchant and naval vessels.

Further inland, construction of wooden ships to maintain the all-important inland water transportation system comprises a vital segment of the Chinese economy. Destruction of such facilities at Huangpu, near Canton, and Hankow would eventually have a serious effect.

3. Electrical and Electronics Industry.

There are two or three electrical and electronic manufacturing installations in Communist China, but they produce only a very small proportion of its requirements. The destruction of these installations would not materially affect China's economic potential for war.

4. Armaments Industry.

Communist China has no large-scale armaments industry according to Western standards. The industry consists mostly of a vast complex of small, widely scattered units producing an extensive range of arms and ammunition. The Mukden arsenal at Shenyang is the largest producer of armaments. Destruction of this plant would reduce Communist China's armament production by approximately 25 percent, creating a deficiency that would place additional requirements for supply before the USSR.

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5. Nonferrous Metals and Nonmetallic Minerals.

Communist China supplies the USSR with important quantities of tin and antimony. Destruction of tin and antimony smelters, while not seriously affecting the Chinese economy or economic potential for war, would reduce supplies of these highly strategic commodities to the USSR. At Kochiu, in the southern part of Yunnan Province, there is a tin smelter and refinery operated by the Yunnan Tin Corporation. This is the largest and the only modern tin smelter in China, and tin production would be considerably cut if this plant were destroyed. The principal antimony smelters of China are situated at Changsha, Hunnan Province. The USSR is short in the supply of antimony, and China is its principal source. The destruction of the smelters at Changsha would curtail production considerably. Cement plants are of particular importance to China because large quantities of cement are required in building construction as a substitute for iron and steel, which are in short supply. From an engineering point of view, cement is an important part of highway and airfield production and maintenance.

6. Machinery and Machine Tool Industries.

The heaviest machinery is produced in plants located at Dairen, Port Arthur, Mukden, Anshan, and Fushan. Machine tools also are produced at these locations and in the Nanking-Shanghai and Tientsin-Peiping areas. Lighter types of machinery are manufactured in the latter two areas and in a few important cities far inland, such as Chungking, Chingte, Lanchow, and Kweilin.

The destruction of the major part of the Chinese and Manchurian machinery and machine tool industries would not cripple Chinese industry as a whole. The major part of needed machinery and machine tools are imported. During 1951, China has obtained the major share of its machinery through imports from the Soviet Bloc countries.

Specialized Chinese production of agricultural implements, textile machinery, and certain key items such as precision instruments is very small. Imports from non-Soviet Bloc areas have accounted recently for nearly all of China's supply of these commodities.

During the Japanese invasion and in World War II, China demonstrated considerable capability in moving its industrial plants inland for better protection from enemy action. Many of these plants were back in production within a remarkably short period following relocation. According to recent information, the Chinese Communist regime is again

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redeploying industry away from congested port cities to interior points which are nearer to raw material sources and domestic markets.

7. Steel Industry.

The Anshan steel mill is the largest and one of the most important steel plants in Communist China. Of a total 1950 production of 500,000 metric tons of crude steel in Communist China, an estimated 400,000 tons were produced at Anshan. Destruction of the Anshan plant would deny essential steel to Chinese armament production and jeopardize both postwar rehabilitation and planned expansion of many other Chinese industries.

One of the largest molybdenite mines in the world is located at Yangchiachangtsu in Manchuria. Destruction of the large beneficiation plant there would eliminate the output of the mine from all further use. Industry in China does not make direct use of this molybdenum output, almost all of the refined material being shipped to the USSR, where it is in critically short supply for use in steel for armaments and jet planes.

8. Petroleum Industry.

It is estimated that the Chinese Communists are 75 percent dependent upon imports of petroleum products from the Soviet Bloc, currently believed to be about 1,500 metric tons daily. The remaining 25 percent of current consumption of petroleum products, amounting to 500 metric tons daily, comes from indigenous sources (400 metric tons daily) and smuggling from non-Bloc sources (100 metric tons daily).

Of the 400 metric tons daily of petroleum products from indigenous sources, 150 tons are produced at Yumen in Kansu Province (1,200 miles inland) and are consumed in northwest China. The remaining 250 tons daily of petroleum products from indigenous sources are produced at synthetic liquid fuel and oil shale plants in Manchuria. These plants are less than 500 miles from Seoul, South Korea. One of these plants, located at Shenyang (Mukden), is reported to be producing synthetic lubricants. There is reported to be a severe shortage of lubricants in Communist China, particularly for the railroads. At Fushin a plant for producing petroleum products from oil shale is scheduled to produce an average of 150 tons daily in 1951. At Kinsi, near the port of Hulatao, a topping plant with a capacity of 400 tons daily is reported to be operating, although probably not at capacity.

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It is known that the USSR Far East region is deficient in petroleum products despite the Sakhalin oil production, so that exports to China must come from western USSR or European Satellite sources. Because of a lack of tankers, nearly all of the required imports of 1,500 tons daily must be delivered by the long haul over the Trans-Siberian Railway and the connecting Manchurian rail network.

It appears that the destruction of the synthetic lubricants plant at Shenyang would have a particularly adverse economic effect on Communist China. However, the destruction of any plants yielding petroleum products, such as those at Fushin and Kinsi, will seriously retard the essential flow of such products to the Chinese economy.

It is obvious that the destruction of stockpiles of petroleum products and of transport facilities upon which imports depend will seriously reduce the availability of such products and retard the economic potential for war of Communist China.

9. Chemical Industry.

The chemical industry of China is made up of a large number of small plants of no industrial importance. Practically all requirements for basic, intermediate, and finished chemicals are supplied by imports. Chemical requirements, although small, are nevertheless highly important. A denial of chemical imports by blockade would therefore seriously hurt the industrial economy of China.

Manchuria is the center of the chemical industry of the northeast provinces. The principal installations, previously but no longer of importance to China, are located within the Soviet-controlled Port Arthur area, specifically at Kanchingtau, near Dairen.

China has no synthetic rubber capacity but is obtaining large quantities of natural rubber from Malaya. Tire production is negligible. Fabrication of simple rubber articles such as rubber heels, soles, some belting, etc., is carried on in numerous small plants in the major cities. Destruction of plants making rubber products would have no significant effect on supplying the requirements for rubber products of a war economy.

10. Agriculture.

The agricultural economy of Communist China, and thus the food supply, would not be significantly affected as a result of systematic air and naval bombardment, because food production is highly decentralized, as is typical of an undeveloped economy. About 80 percent of the population lives on farms, and the development of food processing industries is limited.

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The supplying of food to the military forces would not be seriously impaired, because of the "live off the land" policy whereby a good portion of military food requirements are obtained from local sources and because of the primitive transportation used in supplying the balance.

11. Textiles.

The cotton and woolen textile industries are concentrated in the eastern areas. Shanghai alone has almost half of all the cotton spindles and over two-thirds of all the wool spindles in China. There are nearly 600 textile factories in the Shanghai area, and these are characterized by small-scale production.

12. Forestry.

Manchuria accounts for most of the Chinese lumber production. The Manchurian output is concentrated in the Kirin, Sungkiang, and Hokiang areas. Destruction of the sawmill capacity and thus of the output of lumber and other wood products of these areas would considerably reduce the availability of lumber and wood products.

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S-E-C-R-E-TAnnex AA. Foreign Trade Data for Communist China by Month during 1951.*

China's trade with the West in the first half of 1951 declined from the high level of the second half of 1950. Imports were reduced from \$370 million US to about \$275 to \$300 million in 1951, while exports diminished from \$260 million to probably \$225 million. This decline was offset to some extent by an increase in smuggling.

Soviet Bloc trade with China has shown a remarkable growth in 1951 and now constitutes the major portion of China's trade. In 1950, 80 percent of China's import trade and 70 percent of export trade were with the West. By mid-1951 these percentages were but 30 and 22, respectively, and trade with the USSR comprised about 44 percent of China's imports and 51 percent of its exports. From these percentages and the derived values of trade with the West, trade can be calculated as follows:

Foreign Trade of Communist China
1951

	<u>Millions of US Dollars</u>	
	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Soviet-China Trade	400 to 450	515
Satellite-China Trade	225 to 250	260
West-China Trade	275 to 300	225
Total	<u>900 to 1,000</u>	<u>1,000</u>

The rapid shift in the trade pattern is principally the result of Soviet military aid to China but stems partly from the method of calculating trade with the Satellites. China has apparently included in the Satellite account all goods imported or exported to Poland or on Polish vessels regardless of origin or final destination. A large part of this Polish trade is only transit or transshipment trade designed largely to evade Western trade controls.

* See Tables 1 to 4 following p. 12.

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Most of China's trade with the West is with the Western European countries. India and Pakistan are important in direct trade and also as transshipment points, while Malaya, a major trading partner in the first quarter of 1951, has reduced its trade with China considerably since further controls were added in May.

During 1951, southern China has been the major importing area for trade with Hong Kong and Macao (importing about \$150 million), while northern China imported less than half that amount (\$70 million). The difference was accounted for largely by rubber imports through Canton. Much of this trade had previously gone directly to northern China. The importance of southern China is only a recent development, for in 1950 northern China outranked it as an importing area. The central area (that is, Shanghai) continued to be insignificant for Hong Kong-Macao trade.

Rubber, chemicals, and minerals and their manufactures accounted for two-thirds of total imports through Hong Kong, both in the second half of 1950 and the first half of 1951, supplanting textiles, which had been a major import in early 1950.

The increasing enforcement of Western export controls has forced China to find more transshipment points. Hong Kong and Macao are still important, but Belgium, the Netherlands, India, and Thailand are becoming more active in the China trade. Cargoes are more and more frequently "manifested" to these countries rather than to Hong Kong and then trans-shipped or shipped in transit to China directly or via Hong Kong or Macao.

Hong Kong and Macao continue to be the main sources for smuggling, but clandestine trade between China and Southeast Asia is fairly important. Most of this trade is carried on Chinese junks, and the main item probably is petroleum products picked up in Borneo, Indonesia, and Malaya.

Most of China's trade, including a large part of Soviet-China trade, is seaborne. Burma is the one major land route connecting China to the West, but the amount of goods obtained through Burma is slight. Petroleum products and tires are the main items reaching China over this route, although jeeps, caustic soda, and 5-ton trucks are other items in this movement. It is likely that 200 drums of gasoline, from 300 to 400 drums of oil, and from 300 to 500 tires a month have been getting through to China as of late 1950 and early 1951. This is equivalent to about 25 percent of Macao's shipments to China of these particular goods. However, the total trade going through Burma to China is extremely small when compared with that through Macao.

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Annex A, Table 1

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 CHINA'S IMPORTS, 1951

from selected Western countries*
 (Value in U.S. \$1000; quantity in metric tons)

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	1st Quarter Volume	1st Quarter Value	2nd Quarter Volume	2nd Quarter Value	1st Half Volume	1st Half Value
1. Animals and animal products, inedible Denmark		1		1		2
2. Animals and animal products, edible Denmark		6		10		16
Italy	88	105	-	-	88	105
3. Vegetable food products and beverages Denmark		1		-		1
France	108	20	73	5	181	25
Italy		255	-	-		255
4. Vegetable products, inedible, except fibers and wood France	208	47	130	22	338	69
Italy	69	128	-	-	69	128
5. Textile fibers and manufactures United States		1		-		1
France	17	8	40	14	57	22
Italy		184	-	-		184
Sweden		46		123		169
6. Wood and paper United States		-		27		27
Denmark		-		2		2
Sweden		10		124		134
7. Nonmetallic minerals Belgium - Luxembourg	25	18	40	5	65	23
Sweden		41		6		47

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CHINA'S IMPORTS, 1951
(continued)

Annex A, Table 1 (continued)

	<u>1st Quarter</u>		<u>2nd Quarter</u>		<u>1st Half</u>	
	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Value</u>
8. Metals and manufactures, except machinery and vehicles						
Belgium - Luxembourg	4569	1234	6299	1736	10868	2970
Denmark	1	1		1		2
France	41391	381	7270	71	48661	452
Germany, West	2725	757	1508	372	4233	1129
Sweden		38		12		50
9. Machinery						
Belgium - Luxembourg	230	436	400	539	630	975
Denmark	1	1		35		36
France	209	57	8	2	217	59
Germany, West	331	669	65	354	396	1023
Italy	30	91		4	30	95
Sweden		25		24		49
10. Vehicles and transportation equipment						
Belgium - Luxembourg	9	3	29	28	38	31
France	35	5	127	19	162	24
Germany, West	78	95	62	61	140	156
11. Chemicals and related products						
United States	1	1		-		1
Belgium - Luxembourg	11980	625	20634	169	32614	794
Denmark	1	1		3		4
France	26897	379	51451	186	78348	565
Germany, West	382	764	135	107	517	871
Netherlands	412	147	297	72	709	219
Sweden		5		21		26

*Computed
from official statistics.

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Annex A, Table 2

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CHINA'S EXPORTS, 1951
to selected Western Countries*
(Value in U.S. \$1000; quantity in metric tons)

	<u>1st Quarter</u>		<u>2nd Quarter</u>		<u>1st Half</u>	
	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Value</u>
1. Animals and animal products, inedible						
United States		8885		4872		13757
Belgium - Luxembourg ¹	34782	6323	11507	3623	46289	9946
France	74	248	54	307	128	555
Germany, West ¹	63020	11269	23182	5993	86196	16662
Italy		-		25		25
Netherlands	35	134	5	21	40	155
Sweden ¹		1990		2586		4576
United Kingdom		636		114		750
2. Animals and animal products, edible						
United States		556		95		651
Belgium - Luxembourg ¹			19	33	94	130
France	75	97				
Germany, West ¹			3	2	27	24
Italy	24	22	-	-	2334	180
Netherlands	2334	180				
Sweden ¹						
United Kingdom		2674		497		3171
3. Vegetable food products and beverages						
United States		1709		296		2005
Belgium - Luxembourg ¹			32719	5571	55409	8009
France	22690	2438				
Germany, West ¹		3581		1542		5123
Denmark		4242		863	38770	5105
Italy	33522		5248		81864	8513
Netherlands	32371	2256	45493	6257		
Sweden ¹						
United Kingdom		191		181		372

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 CHINA'S EXPORTS, 1951
 (continued)

Annex A, Table 2 (continued)

	1st Quarter		2nd Quarter		1st Half	
	Volume	Value	Volume	Value	Volume	Value
4. Vegetable products, inedible, except fibers and wood						
United States				1047		4086
Belgium - Luxembourg ¹						275
Denmark					181	887
France	112	556	69	331		
Germany, West ¹						
Netherlands						
Sweden ¹	193	87	2168	3148	2361	1235
United Kingdom		342		391		733
5. Textile fibers and manufactures						
United States		6936		1567		8503
Belgium - Luxembourg		22	70	56	70	78
France	80	440	75	344	155	784
Germany, West	426	313	99	85	525	398
Italy		316		213		529
Sweden		13		3		16
United Kingdom		221		95		316
6. Wood and paper						
United States		245		25		270
Belgium - Luxembourg	15	4	3	1	18	5
Netherlands			71	29	71	29
Sweden		1		1		2
7. Nonmetallic minerals						
United States		185		16		201
Sweden		14		21		35

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CHINA'S EXPORTS, 1951
(continued)

Annex A, Table 2 (continued)

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	1st Quarter		2nd Quarter		1st Half	
	Volume	Value	Volume	Value	Volume	Value
8. Metals and manufactures, except machinery and vehicles						
United States		368		208	1119	576
Germany, West		317		89		406
Sweden	1058	-	61	3		3
9. Machinery						
United States		38		-		38
10. Chemicals and related products						
United States		1977		399		2376
Belgium - Luxembourg		26		46	12	72
France		482		1568	3273	2050
Germany, West	697	59	12	-	85	59
Italy	85	62	2576	77	141	139
Netherlands	77	130	-	10	10	140
Sweden	9	179	64	55		234

*Computed from official statistics.
Total for groups 1 through 4.

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in the first half of 1951

	<u>North China</u>	<u>Middle China</u>	<u>South China</u>	<u>Total China</u>	<u>Macao</u>	<u>Total China & Macao</u>
1. Animals and animal products, edible	559	286	7867	8712	1291	10003
2. Vegetable food products and beverages	5099	5053	10354	20506	2741	23247
3. Animal and vegetable products, inedible	14854	164	12142	27160	119	27279
4. Rubber & manufactures	-	6	-	6	93	99
5. Textile fibers and manufactures	5750	1235	3388	10373	454	10827
6. Wood and paper	237	351	2379	2967	368	3335
7. Nonmetallic minerals	499	313	257	1069	43	1112
8. Metals & manufactures, except machinery & vehicles	424	8	27	459	194	653
9. Machinery	40	13	11	64	132	196
10. Vehicles & transportation equipment	1	-	-	1	35	36
11. Chemicals & related products	1907	521	970	3398	1451	4849
12. Miscellaneous	3809	505	4745	9059	2805	11864
TOTAL	33178	8454	42140	83772	9728	93500
(thousands of U.S. dollars)						

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*Source: Monthly State Despatches from Hong Kong on Hong Kong's Trade with Communist Controlled Areas.

Except rubber, wood, and fibers.

(Columns may not add up to totals due to rounding)

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HONG KONG EXPORTS TO CHINA AND MACAO*
in the first half of 1951

Annex A, Table 4

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	North China	Middle China	South China	Total China	Macao	Total China & Macao
			(thousands of U.S. dollars)			
1. Animals and animal products, edible	7	1355	15	1377	465	1842
2. Vegetable food products and beverages	1177	1370	1037	3584	2014	5598
3. Animal and vegetable products, inedible	283	912	118	1313	1449	2762
4. Rubber & manufactures	5392	258	53858	59508	815	60323
5. Textile fibers and manufactures	6937	1823	4643	13403	1454	14857
6. Wood and paper	2212	995	3148	6355	908	7263
7. Nonmetallic minerals	1043	276	1716	3035	1102	4137
8. Metals & manufactures, except machinery & vehicles	17461	438	20328	38227	1802	40029
9. Machinery	5945	297	6070	12312	763	13075
10. Vehicles & transportation equipment	3035	224	3891	7150	2295	9445
11. Chemicals & related products	20412	5433	26401	52246	8545	60791
12. Miscellaneous	3406	411	5382	9199	1030	10229
TOTAL	67310	13793	126607	207710	22644	230254

*Source: Monthly State Despatches from Hong Kong on Hong Kong's Trade with Communist Controlled Areas.
except rubber, wood, and fibers.

(Columns may not add up to totals due to rounding)

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